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I. INTRODUCTION
An estate tax is a duty imposed upon the right of a dece-
dent to transfer property at death. As the amount of the tax has
increased over the years, the question of who will bear the bur-
den of the estate tax has received increasing attention from es-
tate planners and commentators alike.
Although a decedent is free to designate in a will which of
his assets will bear the estate tax liability, this issue is often left
unresolved. When the will fails to designate which assets will in-
cur liability, the state must make either a legislative or judicial
determination of which assets will bear the burden of state and
federal estate taxes.
This Note will review the different methods that states have
chosen to allocate this burden and the policies behind each
method. Following this review, an in-depth review of South Car-
olina's estate tax allocation experience will be undertaken. The
review will contain an analysis and critical evaluation of the es-
tate tax apportionment provisions in the recently enacted South
Carolina Probate Code ("the Probate Code"). First, however, the
historical underpinnings behind the concept of estate tax appor-
tionment will be examined.
II. THE HISTORY OF ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT
The federal estate tax,1 as it is presently known,2 was en-
1. I.R,C. §§ 2001-2663 (1986). The estate tax computation for estates of United
States citizens involves several steps. The starting point for the computation of the tax is
the calculation of the decedent's gross estate. The gross estate includes not only property
of the decedent passing by will or under the intestate laws, but it also includes the value
of certain non-probate assets included under §§ 2035-2044. Following the calculation of
the gross estate, the taxable estate is determined by subtracting from the gross estate the
deductions authorized under § 2053 (funeral and administrative expenses, claims and
debts), § 2054 (casualty losses), § 2055 (charitable bequests), and § 2056 (marital deduc-
[Vol. 39
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acted in 1916 as a revenue raising device during the first World
War.' The tax was different from many state-imposed inheri-
tance taxes that taxed a beneficiary's right to receive property at
a decedent's death.4 In Y.M.C.A. v. Davis5 the United States Su-
preme Court distinguished the estate tax from the inheritance
tax as follows:
What was being imposed here was an excise upon the transfer
of an estate upon death of the owner. It was not a tax upon
succession and receipt of benefits under the law or the
will .... What this law taxes is not the interest to which the
legatees and devisees succeeded on death, but the interest
which ceased by reason of the death.8
As the federal estate tax evolved, it taxed far more than
those assets passing under a decedent's will. Under several sec-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code"), Congress
mandated that, because certain transfers outside of the probate
estate were testamentary in nature, the value of these non-pro-
bate transfers also should be included in the taxable estate of
the decedent.8 These non-probate transfers have come to in-
clude: (1) completed gifts made within three years of death,9 (2)
transfers with a retained life interest or with a retained power to
designate the right to enjoy the benefits of the transferred prop-
tion). Following the addition of any adjusted taxable gifts to the taxable estate, the uni-
fied transfer tax rates, as set out in § 2001, are applied to the adjusted taxable base. The
actual tax due is determined by the tax due on the taxable estate less any of the follow-
ing applicable credits: unified credit (§ 2010), credit for state death taxes paid with re-
spect to property included in the gross estate (§ 2011), death taxes paid to a foreign
country in respect of property situated in a foreign country and included in the gross
estate (§ 2014), and federal estate taxes paid by another decedent with respect to the
property transferred by that decedent to the current decedent (§ 2013). 4 J. RABKIN & M.
JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, Gir AND ESTATE TAXATION § 53.01 (1987).
2. Congress enacted and repealed death taxes on several occasions prior to 1916.
Eisentein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REv. 223, 223-26 (1956).
3. Id.
4. Comment, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax-Should North Carolina
Adopt an Apportionment Statute?, 52 N.C.L. REv. 737, 738 (1974).
5. 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
6. Id. at 50.
7. I.R.C. §§ 2031-2044.
8. Note, Equitable Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax Liability: The Neces-
sity of Clarifying Legislation, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 703, 703.
9. I.R.C. § 2035.
1988]
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erty,10 (3) transfers taking effect at death,1" (4) revocable
trusts, 2 (5) transfers by virtue of interests held by the decedent
in joint tenancy,13 (6) property subject to a general power of ap-
pointment,14 (7) transfers for less than full or adequate consider-
ation,' 5 (8) certain annuities and nonqualified employee bene-
fits, 16 and (9) proceeds of life insurance policies.
17
Although making the personal representative responsible for
its payment,' the early federal estate tax 9 did not address the
question of who bears the tax burden.20 Three provisions that
singled out three non-probate transfers to bear their share of the
estate tax liability, however, were subsequently added to the
Code. In 1919 the Code was amended to permit the executor to
recover contributions for payment of estate taxes from benefi-
10. Id. § 2036.
11. Id. § 2037. These transfers are deemed to take effect at death either because the
recipient must survive the testator to receive the transferred property or because the
testator retains a reversionary interest.
12. Id. § 2038.
13. Id. § 2040.
14. Id. § 2041.
15. Id. § 2043.
16. Id. § 2039.
17. Id. § 2042.
18. Id. § 205 (current version at I.R.C. § 2002) stating "the tax imposed by this
chapter shall be paid by the executor." If any portion of this tax is paid by a recipient of
non-probate property, that recipient is entitled to reimbursement from the personal rep-
resentative under I.R.C.§ 2205. Section 2205 provides:
If the tax or any part thereof is paid by, or collected out of, that part of the
estate passing to or in the possession of any person other than the executor in
his capacity as such, such persons shall be entitled to reimbursement out of
any part of the estate still undistributed or by a just and equitable contribu-
tion by the persons whose interest in the estate of the decedent would have
been reduced if the tax had been paid before the distribution of the estate or
whose interest is subject to equal or prior liability for the payment of taxes,
debts, or other charges against the estate, it being the purpose and intent of
this chapter that so far as is practicable and unless otherwise directed by the
will of the decedent the tax shall be paid out of the estate before its
distribution.
Unless an extension is granted, the personal representative must pay the tax at the
time the estate tax return is filed with the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). If the tax is
not paid by the personal representative when it is due, a tax lien will be placed upon all
the real and personal property of the personal representative in favor of the United
States Government. I.R.C.§ 6321.
19. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 200, 39 Stat. 777 (1916) (current version at
I.R.C. §§ 2001-2663 (1987)).
20. Comment, Federal Estate Tax Apportionment, 16 DE PAuL L. REV. 112, 114
(1966).
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ciaries of life insurance policies. In 1942 a similar section was
added to permit the executor to recover contributions for pay-
ment of estate taxes from beneficiaries of a general power of ap-
pointment.2 ' Finally, in 1981, section 2207A was added to permit
the executor to recover contributions for payment of estate taxes
from beneficiaries of Q-TIP property.22 Except for these three
provisions, the Code has remained silent on apportionment,
leaving the states to decide the issue of who bears the federal
21. I.R.C.§ 2206 (life insurance) (originally enacted as Revenue Act of 1919, ch. 18,§
400, 40 Stat. 1100 (1919)); I.R.C. § 2207 (powers of appointment) (originally enacted as
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 403(c), 56 Stat. 943 (1942)). These provisions apply in
the absence of a contrary provision in the decedent's will. Also, these sections contain a
provision that allocates the marital deduction in an estate, first to insurance proceeds
and then to powers of appointment.
The language of these sections does not impose a mandatory requirement on the
personal representative to seek contribution. At least one court, however, has held that
these provisions are mandatory. Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 121 Ind. App. 136,
96 N.E.2d 918 (1951).
In those states having an apportionment statute, it and the Code mandate that the
share of the estate tax attributable to Q-TIP property, life insurance proceeds, or general
powers of appointment be borne by the beneficiary of the property. In states requiring
that the residuary bear the tax liability, the federal apportionment provisions control.
See infra p. 614 & note 39.
22. I.R.C.§ 2207A. Under § 2056, a marital deduction is allowed for property in-
cluded in the gross estate that passes to a surviving spouse. The deduction, however,
contemplates that the surviving spouse will receive the entire interest in the property
transferred. In situations in which the surviving spouse receives less than the entire in-
terest in the property, the bequest may be classified as a terminable interest and not
qualify for the marital deduction. Life estates, estates for years, annuities, patents, and
copyrights are examples of estates that the Code identifies as terminable. RABKEN &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 53.05.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 allows certain terminable interests to qual-
ify for the marital deduction in post-1981 estates. Under § 2056(b)(7), a testator may
leave a surviving spouse a life estate in certain trust income, for example, a Q-TIP trust,
which qualifies for the marital deduction if certain requirements are met. The testator
may direct who will receive the property after the spouse's death since the Code does not
require that the surviving spouse be given a power of appointment over the property.
RABKmN & JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 53.05.
To qualify for the marital deduction, the personal representative of the decedent's
estate must irrevocably elect to claim the marital deduction on the estate tax return.
I.R.C. § 2056 (b)(7)(B)(V). Also, the surviving spouse must be entitled to all of the in-
come from the property, the income must be payable at least annually, and no person
should have a power to appoint any part of the property during the spouse's lifetime.
I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii).
Under § 2207A, unless the surviving spouse's will provides otherwise, the estate may
recover from the Q-TIP property any additional estate tax resulting from the inclusion
of the property in the gross estate. If there are two or more beneficiaries, the entire
amount of the additional estate tax may be recovered from either beneficiary. RABKIN &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 53.05.
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estate tax burden.
The early federal estate tax was so modest that most states
treated it as just another claim against the estate, charging it to
the residuary estate.23 As the purpose of the tax began to shift
from a revenue raising device toward a means of redistributing
wealth, the tax rates began to rise gradually.24 As states began
using the burden-on-the-residue rule in a climate of higher es-
tate tax rates, plaintiffs began requesting equitable apportion-
ment in situations in which the federal estate tax exhausted the
residuary estate.25
Although one early New Hampshire case26 did allow the ap-
portionment of the federal estate tax to certain specific legatees
in a will, the common law almost unanimously upheld the bur-
den-on-the-residue rule over efforts to apportion the tax to other
probate and non-probate beneficiaries. The rationale for this
rule appears to have rested on three separate views. One view
suggested that Congress had preempted the field of apportion-
ment and precluded the states from acting in this area since it
had already authorized apportionment of life insurance and gen-
eral powers of appointment.28 Another view suggested that a de-
cedent had impliedly manifested his intention that the tax bur-
den fall on the residuary estate when a will contained specific
devises along with a residuary gift.29 The third view equated the
Code's requirement that the executor pay the estate tax prior to
the distribution of the probate property with the common-law
requirement that all debts and administrative expenses be paid
from the residuary clause. Since the estate tax obligation was an
estate debt, it was required to be paid out of the residuary
estate.3
In an attempt to ameliorate the problems presented by the
23. Wintermute, Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax in Arizona, 17
ARIZ. L. REV. 1135, 1139 (1975).
24. Id.
25. See Comment, supra note 20, at 114.
26. Fuller v. Gale, 78 N.H. 544, 103 A. 308 (1918).
27. See Comment, supra note 20, at 115.
28. Id. (citing Bernis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923); Farmers Loan
Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769 (1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 633 (1925)).
29. Id. at 114 (citing Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), aff'd,
264 U.S. 47 (1924)).
30. Id. at 114-15 (citing Hephburn v. Winthrop, 83 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1936);
Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919)).
[Vol. 39
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burden-on-the-residue rule, New York adopted the first appor-
tionment statute in 1930.31 This statute was a total apportion-
ment statute, apportioning the estate tax among all of the taxa-
ble estate's probate and non-probate beneficiaries on a pro rata
basis.3 2 Some ten years after the statute was passed, however, its
constitutionality was challenged in Riggs v. Del Drago.3
Del Drago concerned a will with three major components.
One legatee, in addition to receiving certain specific bequests,
received the residuary estate in the form of a life trust, the re-
mainder going to other designated parties. The will also created
a second trust with designated life and remainder interests.
Since the will did not provide for the payment of estate taxes,
the executor of the testator's estate sought to have the taxes ap-
portioned in accordance with the New York statute. In response,
the life tenants and the outright legatee filed a suit challenging
the statute's constitutionality. The remainderman of the residu-
ary trust contended that the estate tax had to be apportioned
under the statute.3
Although the New York Court of Appeals invalidated the
statute on the ground that it violated the supremacy clause of
the constitution, 5 the United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding:
We are of the opinion that Congress intended that the federal
estate tax should be paid out of the estate as a whole, and that
the applicable state law as to the devolution of property at
death should govern the distribution of the remainder and the
ultimate impact of the federal tax .... 3
31. Wintermute, supra note 23, at 1140.
32. Id.
33. 317 U.S. 95 (1942) (rev'g In re Del Drago's Estate, 287 N.Y. 61, 38 N.E.2d 131
(1941)).
34. Id. at 96-98.
35. In its opinion, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated the New York statute
because it conflicted with the provisions of the Code, in violation of the supremacy
clause of the Constitution. 287 N.Y. at 79, 38 N.E.2d at 140. The particular provision in
question was section 826(b) of the 1939 Code, now I.R.C. § 2205, which states: "so far as
practicable ... the tax shall be paid out of the estate before its distribution." The court
also noted that the statute was at odds with another provision of § 826(b) that gave a
beneficiary who pays the tax the right "to reimbursement out of any part of the estate
still undistributed or by just and equitable contribution by the person whose interests in
the estate of the decedent would have been reduced if the tax had been paid before the
distribution of the estate." 287 N.Y. at 70, 38 N.E.2d at 135.
36. 317 U.S. at 97-98.
1988]
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The Court reasoned that Congress had not intended to control
the allocation of the estate tax burden under the Code.3 7 Al-
though the Code imposed a duty on the executor to pay the es-
tate tax prior to the distribution of the probate assets, the Court
noted that these provisions provided only a statutory mecha-
nism for the collection and payment of the tax and did not de-
termine upon whom the burden of the tax fell." While the Court
sanctioned the role of state statutes in determining who should
bear the tax burden, it neglected to address the role, if any, of
the Code's existing apportionment provisions in determining
this issue. 9
37. Id. at 98.
38. Id.
39. By enacting I.R.C. § 2205, Congress manifested its intent that the federal estate
tax be allocated to the residuary estate. Del Drago, however, stated that this provision
was permissive, giving the states the latitude of enacting their own apportionment
schemes. As previously noted, Congress attempted to apportion estate taxes with regard
to three types of non-probate property: Q-TIP trusts, general powers of appointment,
and life insurance proceeds. See supra notes 21, 22, and accompanying text. Since Del
Drago apparently held that state law determines who bears the burden of the estate tax,
the question has been raised whether sections 2206, 2207, and 2207A would prevail over
contrary state law provisions. See Kahn, The Federal Estate Tax Burden Borne by a
Dissenting Widow, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1499, 1511 (1966); Wintermute, supra note 23, at
1136-37 n.7 ("Where this conflict occurred, it would be necessary to determine whether
the Internal Revenue Code preempts local statutory or common law.").
Several decisions have held that the federal provisions apportioning the estate tax to
certain non-probate transfers preempt state statutory and common law. McAleer v. Jer-
nigan, 804 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1986), is illustrative. McAleer was an action by the ad-
ministrator of an estate against the decedent's former wife, pursuant to I.R.C. § 2206, to
recover the share of the estate taxes attributable to certain life insurance proceeds. The
former wife asserted that, pursuant to Alabama's apportionment statute, the residuary
estate was responsible for the payment of the entire estate tax obligation. Requiring that
a percentage of the tax be apportioned to the former wife, the court held:
[U]nder the reasoning of [Del Drago], in the absence of congressional enact-
ments to the contrary, state law governs the allocation of the burden of taxes
as to property that is part of the estate, and where Congress has spoken, as
with life insurance proceeds not part of the estate, federal law governs.
804 F.2d at 1233. For other cases holding that federal apportionment provisions prevail
over contrary state law, see Priedeman v. Jamison, 356 Mo. 627, 202 S.W.2d 900 (1947);
First Nat'l Bank v. Dixon, 38 N.C. App. 430, 248 S.E.2d 416 (1978); In re Singer's Estate,
80 Misc. 2d 1006, 363 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Surr. Ct. 1975). In states having an estate tax, the
apportionment of the state estate tax with respect to life insurance proceeds and general
powers of appointment is determined by the state statute. See In re William's Estate,
189 Misc. 210, 68 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
The Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act ("the Uniform Act") attempts to re-
solve conflicts between the federal estate tax provisions and a conflicting state apportion-
ment statute. The Act states:
If the liabilities of persons interested in the estate as prescribed by this act
8
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After Del Drago state legislatures quickly passed various
forms of apportionment statutes. To date, forty states have
adopted some form of a statutory apportionment scheme. 40 An-
other four states rely on judicially mandated apportionment
schemes.41 Many of the states have adopted a version of the
Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act.42 Others have adopted
the apportionment statute of the Uniform Probate Code, which
is an adaptation of the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment
Act.43 Seven jurisdictions, however, have not been swayed by the
arguments supporting apportionment and continue to rely on
the burden-on-the-residue rule." In fact, some states adopting
apportionment statutes later repealed them.45
III. ALTERNATIVE ESTATE TAX ALLOCATION SCHEMES
In the absence of specific instructions in the testator's will,
states have devised three methods of determining which assets
will bear the federal estate tax burden. The burden-on-the-resi-
due rule4" places the entire burden on the residuary estate, re-
differ from those which result under the Federal Estate tax law, the liabilities
imposed by the federal law will control and the balance of this Section shall
apply as if the resulting liabilities had been prescribed herein.
REVISED UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT § 9 (1964). This provision has been omit-
ted from the South Carolina statute.
40. See infra notes 57-58.
41. Id.
42. REVISED UNIp. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT AcT (1964); UNU?. ESTATE TAX AP-
PORTIONMENT AcT (1958). Fifteen states have adopted the original or revised version of
the Uniform Act: Alaska (1958), Hawaii (1964), Idaho (1964), Maryland (1964), Michigan
(1958), Montana (1958), New Hampshire (1958), North Carolina (1964), North Dakota
(1964), Oregon (1964), Rhode Island (1964), Texas (1964), Vermont (1964), Washington
(1964), and Wyoming (1958).
43. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-916 (1986). Seven states have adopted the version of
the Uniform Act contained at § 3-916 of the Uniform Probate Code: Colorado, Maine,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Utah. Arizona, Florida, and
Kentucky adopted the Uniform Probate Code without § 3-916.
44. See infra note 46.
45. Oklahoma, Texas, and Maine have repealed apportionment statutes. Maine,
however, enacted a new apportionment statute, which became effective on January 1,
1981. 1 [Estate & Gift] FED. TAXES (P-H) 120,025, at 140,249.
46. Three states have judicially retained the burden-on-the-residue rule. See Mazza
v. Mazza, 475 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Jackson v. Jackson, 217 Kan. 448, 536 P.2d 1400
(1975); In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953). The following states
have codified the rule: ALA. CODE § 40-15-18 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-12-2 (1982);
IOWA CODE § 633.449 (Supp. 1987) (Iowa does, however, protect property passing to the
9
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gardless of the extent to which the probate assets contribute to
the ultimate tax liability.47 The rule is appealing for several rea-
sons. By treating the federal estate tax as another claim against
the estate, it permits the uniform administration of all estates.
Also, since the tax need not be apportioned to and collected
from each beneficiary, the rule promotes the prompt distribution
of all the assets under the control of the personal
representative. 8
Opponents decry the common-law rule for four reasons.
First, when the drafter of the will is either unfamiliar with the
rule or is unaware of the size of the testator's non-probate es-
tate, the rule purportedly fosters inequality and may distort the
testator's intent.49 In re Gato's Estate5" and In re Mellon's Es-
tate1 illustrate this point. In both cases, an entire probate es-
tate, was required to pay a federal estate tax liability made exor-
bitantly high by assets passing outside of the probate estate.
A second alleged problem with the burden-on-the-residue
rule is that it increases estate tax liability when deductible gifts,
such as a devise to a surviving spouse or a charitable devise, are
made through the residuary clause of a will.52 This increase oc-
curs because a tax deduction is limited to the amount passing to
the recipient of the deductible gift under the Code. If a deducti-
ble share is decreased by the entire amount of estate taxes, the
taxable estate will grow by the amount of taxes paid, producing
a greater estate tax liability.
53
Third, the common-law rule is criticized because it allows
surviving spouse from diminution, even if the surviving spouse receives a residuary be-
quest). Mississippi has adopted the rule by judicial decision and statute. Stovall v.
Stovall, 360 So. 2d 679 (Miss. 1978); Estate of Torian v. First Nat'l Bank, 321 So. 2d 287
(Miss. 1975).
47. Note, supra note 8, at 706.
43. For an in-depth analysis of the advantages of the burden-on-the residue rule, see
Wintermute, supra note 23, at 1142-43.
49. Id.
50. 276 A.D. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171, aff'd, 301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E.2d 924 (1950). Gato
concerned a probate estate of $180,000 that was completely exhausted because two trusts
were included in the calculation of the gross estate for estate tax purposes.
51. 347 Pa. 520, 32 A.2d 749 (1943). Mellon concerned a probate estate of over $11
million. The taxable estate, however, exceeded $90 million due to several large gifts made
in contemplation of death. The tax on the estate exceeded $37 million, completely ex-
hausting the residuary estate as well as the entire probate estate.
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for the reduction of certain residuary gifts that do not contrib-
ute to the estate tax liability.5 4 Again, this problem occurs when
the recipient of a deductible gift is a residuary beneficiary. Crit-
ics of the burden-on-the-residue rule believe that the reduction
of a gift that does not contribute to the estate tax liability to
obtain the necessary funds to pay that liability is incongruous in
light of the federal policies favoring the deduction."
Finally, a strong policy argument for the abrogation of the
common-law rule can be based on the notion that a testator's
family is usually the recipient of a residuary gift. By allowing
the depletion of the residuary estate to be depleted by the
amount of the estate's taxes, the rule may ultimately force the
testator's dependents to rely on the state for support, an out-
come clearly contrary to the testator's wishes.56
In response to these arguments, a majority of states have
adopted a scheme of either partial" or total apportionment. A
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1144-45.
57. Arizona and Illinois have judicially adopted the rule of partial equitable appor-
tionment. See Deetsch v. Deetsch, 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963); Roe v. Estate of Farrell,
69 Ill. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978). Four states have codified the rule. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 733.817 (West 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch., 65A, §§ 5, 5A, 5B (West 1969 &
Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B: 24-1 to -8 (West 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §§ 3701-
06 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
58. Total equitable apportionment has been enacted in 36 states by statute. See
ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.610 (1985); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-59-115 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 12-401 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-916 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 2901-06 (1987); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 236A-1 to -9 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-916
(1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-2-12-1 to -7 (Burns 1972 & Supp. 1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:2431 - :2438 (West 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3-916 (1981); MD. EST. &
TRusTs CODE ANN. § 11-109 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 720.11 - .21 (West 1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-916 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-16-601 to -612
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2108 to -2112 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 150.290-.390
(1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 88-A:1 to :12 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-3-916 (Spec.
Pamphlet 1976); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.8 (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-27-1 to -9 (Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-20-16
(1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.86 (Anderson Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68,
§ 825 (West 1966 & Supp. 1987); 0R. REv. STAT. §§ 116.303 - .383 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 44-23.1-1 to .1-12 (1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916 (Law. Co-op. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. 29-7-1 to -7 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-614 (1984); TEXAS PROB. CODE
ANN. § 322A (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-916 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 7301- 09 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-160 to .1-165 (1987); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 83.110.010 to .904 (West Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 44-2-16a (1982); Wyo.
STAT. §§ 2-10-101 to -116 (1977).
Kentucky and Missouri judicially adopted total equitable apportionment. Gratz v.
1988]
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rule of partial apportionment partially relieves the residuary es-
tate of the tax burden by requiring the recipients of non-probate
property to pay their proportionate share of the estate tax; the
estate tax attributable to the probate assets are still paid out of
the residuary estate.5 9 A rule of total apportionment relieves the
residuary of the burden to a greater extent by also requiring the
general devises, e° specific devises, 61 and demonstrative legacies"
passing under a will to pay their proportionate share of the es-
tate tax liability.
3
A plethora of arguments can be made for the total appor-
tionment scheme. An initial equitable argument is that fairness
dictates that each asset responsible for the estate tax liability
pay its proportionate share of the tax. 4 Also, public policy
seems to favor total apportionment because this scheme is more
likely to prevent the depletion of the residuary estate, leaving
sufficient assets to support the testator's family. 5 Finally, since
the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Acts use total ap-
portionment, an argument can be based on the laudable goal of
obtaining national uniformity in this area. 6
Proponents of the partial apportionment scheme rely on
two arguments to show its superiority. First, they assert that,
absent a specific provision in a will concerning the payment of
estate taxes, a testator would want the general or specific devi-
sees to obtain the property passing under the will without a con-
Hamilton, 309 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1958); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d
632 (1954).
59. Note, supra note 8, at 707.
60. A general devise is a "[g]ift payable out of [the] general assets of the estate, not
amounting to a bequest of [a] particular thing or money." Id. at 615. When a testator
makes a general devise, he'generally wants the beneficiary to receive value as opposed to
a specific item. Gifts of money in a will are the most common form of general devises.
61. "A specific devise is a gift by will of a specific article or part of [the] testator's
estate, which is identified and distinguished from all things of [the] same kind and which
may be satisfied only by delivery of the particular things." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1254-55 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
62. A demonstrative legacy is a general legacy payable from a specific item, e.g., "a
gift of $10,000 payable from the sale of my stock." See id. at 389. If the specific source of
the funds for paying the legacy is not available at the testator's death, other assets of the
estate are sold to pay this general devise.
63. Note, supra note 8, at 707.
64. Wintermute, supra note 23, at 1145.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1146.
618 [Vol. 39
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comitant obligation to pay a portion of the federal estate tax.
This argument is based on the notion that a testator, when mak-
ing transfers outside of his probate estate, does not realize that
these transfers will have an effect upon his estate tax liability. If
the testator was aware of the tax consequences of these non-pro-
bate transfers, however, he would want this property to shoulder
its proportionate share of the estate tax rather than placing this
liability on the probate assets.
Specific and general bequests, unlike non-probate transfers,
are generally based upon pretax property values. To diminish
these gifts by charging each beneficiary with a share of the tax
liability would be contrary to the testator's wishes."
A second argument favoring partial apportionment is that it
is a simpler system to administer when compared with total ap-
portionment. Since property passing to general and specific dev-
isees is not taxed, the personal representative is required to seek
contribution only from the beneficiaries of non-probate assets.
Similarly, a partial apportionment scheme creates fewer ac-
counting difficulties. Although the accounting problem would
appears to be a minor impediment, apportionment under a will
containing an abundance of specific and general devises would
be onerous, requiring the personal representative to calculate
and account for each tax share until he pays it to the IRS.6
IV. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Common Law
Before South Carolina adopted a statutory estate tax appor-
tionment scheme, a system of partial apportionment evolved
under the common law. Early South Carolina cases formulated
the general rule that the residuary estate is first applied to the
payment of debts owed by the decedent's estate in the absence
of specific instructions in the testator's will. 9 If the residuary
67. Id. at 1145.
68. Id. at 1146.
69. Patterson v. Cleveland, 165 S.C. 276, 163 S.E. 788 (1932), was the first South
Carolina case to hold that a testator was free to designate which gifts should bear the
burden of estate or inheritance taxes. For earlier cases holding that a testator may desig-
nate certain assets to satisfy the obligations of his estate, contrary to the common-law
order of abatement, see Drayton v. Rose, 28 S.C. Eq. (7 Rich. Eq.) 328 (1855); Pell v.
19881 619
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estate is inadequate to meet these obligations, then general de-
vises and specific devises, in that order, are applied to these ob-
ligations.70 This general rule was subsequently applied to debts
created by the federal estate tax in Gaither v. United States
Trust Co. 1
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Myers v. Sinkler
7 2
explicitly rejected the contention that the burden-on-the-residue
rule, as established in Gaither, applied to assets passing outside
of the probate estate. In Myers the testator conveyed several
parcels of property to a trust, naming herself as the income ben-
eficiary. According to the trust instrument, the income would go
to her surviving sisters after her death. Upon their death, the
income would go to certain of the testator's nieces and nephews
living at the death of her last surviving sister.7 3
The decedent's will directed that all inheritance and estate
taxes "shall be paid out of my residuary estate as an expense of
administration, in order that all legacies and bequests made by
my Will shall be free from the same. '74 Finding that this provi-
sion only evidenced an intent by the testator to charge the resid-
uary estate with the portion of the estate tax generated by the
probate assets,75 the court characterized the issue as follows:
In the absence of statute or express direction in either the trust
deed or the will, should the ultimate burden of estate and in-
heritance taxes be borne solely by the residuary probate estate,
or notably, under the principle of equitable apportionment, by
both the probate and the non-probate estates?
7
After noting that a finding either way could be supported by the
law of other jurisdictions,77 the court concluded that non-pro-
bate assets were required to bear their share of the federal estate
Ball's Ex'rs, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 518 (1844).
70. See Brown v. James, 22 S.C. Eq. (3 Stroh. Eq.) 24 (1849); Duncan v. Tobin, 13
S.C. Eq. (Dud. Eq.) 161 (1838); Warley v. Warley, 8 S.C. Eq. (Bail. Eq.) 397 (1831). The
current order of abatement in South Carolina is codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-902
(Law. Co-op. 1987).
71. 230 S.C. 568, 97 S.E.2d 24 (1957).
72. 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241 (1959).
73. Id. at 166, 110 S.E.2d at 242.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 167-68, 110 S.E.2d at 243.
76. Id. at 167, 110 S.E.2d at 242.
77. Id. at 170-73, 110 S.E.2d at 244-46.
[Vol. 39620
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tax."' The court reasoned that equitable apportionment was su-
perior to a burden-on-the-residue rule for two reasons. First, for
federal estate tax purposes, a taxable estate is composed two
separate estates-probate and non-probate.79 Second, an equita-
ble apportionment rule would most often carry out the testator's
intent since the testator would not contemplate that non-pro-
bate assets would be included as part of his estate for tax pur-
poses or that the tax burden of these assets would be borne by
the residuary beneficiaries.8 0
Subsequent cases noted that the rule of equitable appor-
tionment between probate and non-probate assets could be va-
ried by a provision in the will directing that estate taxes be paid
from specific assets.8" Dial v. Ridgewood Tuberculosis Sanato-
rium concerned a will provision stating that all of the testatrix's
federal estate taxes be paid out of her residuary estate. Overrul-
ing a lower court decision requiring that only the portion of es-
tate taxes attributable to the probate assets be paid out of the
residuary estate, the court held that the entire tax was payable
from the residuary estate.2 The court did not rely solely on the
provision in the will but looked to extrinsic evidence to conclude
that the testator intended that her entire federal estate tax lia-
bility be borne by the residuary estate.8
B. Statutory Law
In 1961 South Carolina enacted an estate tax in Title 12 of
the South Carolina Code, which replaced the state's inheritance
tax enacted in 1922.84 Section 12-15-1540 of that title addressed
how the tax burden was to be allocated. 5 It stated:
Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any
part of the gross estate on which the tax has been paid consists
78. Id. at 173-74, 110 S.E.2d at 246.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Dial v. Ridgewood Tuberculosis Sanatorium, 240 S.C. 64, 124 S.E.2d 598 (1962).
82. Id. at 72, 124 S.E.2d at 601.
83. Id. at 74, 124 S.E.2d at 602.
84. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-15-10 to -1610 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1987). In the
1952 South Carolina Code, the state's inheritance tax was codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§
65-451 to -529 (1952) (repealed 1961).
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15-1540 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1987).
1988]
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of the value of property included in the gross estate under sec-
tions 12-15-40 or 12-15-230 by reason of their reference to the
provisions of sections 2034 to 2044, inclusive, of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, the executor shall be enti-
tled to recover from the person receiving or in possession of
such property such portion of the total tax paid as the value of
such property bears to the sum of the taxable estate .... 88
Since sections 2034 through 204487 of the Code concerned
those assets passing outside of a testator's will, section 12-15-
1540 preserved the common-law partial apportionment rule as
articulated in Myers, at least with regard to the South Carolina
estate tax. A 1969 amendment to Title 12 made section 12-15-
1540 applicable to the federal estate tax as well.88
Although section 12-15-1540 sufficiently informed South
Carolinians which assets of the testator's probate and non-pro-
bate estates would bear the ultimate burden of estate taxes if
the testator did not make such a designation in the will, it was
woefully deficient in addressing the myriad of issues that from
time to time present themselves in the estate tax apportionment
context. The section did not resolve, for example, issues such as
the apportionment of interest and penalties, the tax on a life
estate given at the testator's death, and the tax liability of a de-
ductible share passing under a will.
To address these unresolved issues, the South Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly passed a comprehensive estate tax apportionment
statute" ("the statute") in 1987 as part of the Probate Code.90
86. Id.
87. The non-probate transfers referred to in these sections of the Code and incorpo-
rated into section 12-15-1540 are the following. (1) § 2034, dower and curtesy interests;
(2) § 2035, transactions in contemplation of death; (3) § 2036, transfers with a retained
life estate; (4) § 2037, transfers taking effect at death; (5) § 2038, revocable transfers; (6)
§ 2039, annuities; (7) § 2040, joint interests; (8) § 2041, powers of appointment; (9) §
2042, proceeds of life insurance; (10) § 2043, transfers for insufficient consideration; and
(11) § 2044, prior interests.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15-1550 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1987). This provision
states: "The provisions of § 12-15-1540 shall apply to the Federal estate tax levied under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended."
89. The estate tax apportionment provisions of the Probate Code are codified at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-3-916 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
90. South Carolina Probate Code, 1986 S.C. Acts 34. The South Carolina Probate
Code is codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1-100 to -7-602 (Law. Co-op. 1987) and became
effective on July 1, 1987. For a history of the Probate Code, see Le Blanc, The Proposed
South Carolina Probate Code, 36 S.C.L. REV. 511 (1985). For a comparison of the South
[Vol. 39622
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The statute attempts to grapple with the complexities of estate
tax apportionment not addressed by section 12-15-1540. With
several minor changes, the statute follows the Revised Uniform
Estate Tax Apportionment Act ("the Revised Uniform Act"),91
which the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved in 1964.92 The remainder of this Note will
analyze the apportionment provisions of the Probate Code and
the effect of these provisions on the law of estate tax apportion-
ment in South Carolina.
V. THE NEW SOUTH CAROLINA ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT
STATUTE
A. Apportionment Scheme
The South Carolina estate tax apportionment provisions
Carolina Probate Code to prior South Carolina law, see Medlin, Selected Substantive
Provisions of the South Carolina Probate Code: A Comparison with Previous South
Carolina Law, 38 S.C.L. REv. 611 (1987).
91. REVISED UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT (1964).
92. The original version of the Uniform Act was passed by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August 1958. It gained immediate approval
from the American Bar Association. The Uniform Act was revised in 1964 to provide for
payment out of the residue of the estate when payment could not be collected from a
person required to pay the tax. See Scoles & Stephens, The Proposed Uniform Estate
Tax Apportionment Act, 43 MINN. L. REv. 907, 917 (1959); Note, supra note 8, at 713-14
n. 55.
The eight substantive and five procedural sections of the Uniform Act are not all
contained in the Uniform Probate Code's estate tax apportionment provisions. The Uni-
form Probate Code omits all the procedural sections. Four major substantive provisions
of the Uniform Act have also been changed by the Uniform Probate Code. First, the
Uniform Probate Code does not provide for payment out of the residue of the estate
when payment cannot be collected from a person required to pay the tax, as provided by
the 1964 revision of the Uniform Act, but it reallocates the apportioned share of the
estate tax to all probate and non-probate beneficiaries whose gifts contribute to the es-
tate tax liability. Second, the Uniform Probate Code has no provision for the apportion-
ment of expenses incurred in calculating and collecting the apportioned share of the tax,
as the Uniform Act does. Third, the personal representative under the Uniform Probate
Code can determine apportionment on his own initiative, instead of through a court or-
der, since judicial determination of apportionment is not required. Finally, the Uniform
Act attempts to grapple with one problem involved in multistate estate administration,
allowing a personal representative to seek contribution from a nonresident beneficiary
only if the jurisdiction of the decedent affords a substantially similar remedy. REviSED
UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT AcT § 8 (1964). For a criticism of this section of the
Uniform Act, see Scoles & Stephens, supra, at 935. For a listing of differences between
the Uniform Act and the Uniform Probate Code, see Note, supra note 8, at 714-15 n.58.
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contained in the Probate Code apportion the estate tax among
all persons receiving probate and non-probate assets." This is a
drastic change from prior law, which apportioned the estate tax
only to non-probate property and left the residuary estate to
bear the tax liability for general devises, specific devises, and de-
monstrative devises. 4 Devises outside the residuary estate, no
matter how small, now are forced to bear their share of the tax
liability unless exonerated by a contrary will provision.e5
B. Computation
The statute provides for the apportionment of taxes among
probate and non-probate assets as follows:98
value of an individual's
interest in the estate x total tax = recipient's share
total value of the interests
of the tax of all persons
interested in the estate
This provision is compatible with the two federal statutory ap-
portionment provisions addressing life insurance proceeds and
general powers of apportionment because each uses this formula
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987). The language of § 62-3-916(b),
which apportions the estate tax among both probate and non-probate assets, is as fol-
lows: "[T]he tax shall be apportioned among all persons interested in the estate." Scoles
& Stephens, supra note 92, at 918. This is further substantiated by the Reporter's Com-
ment to § 62-3-916(b), which states the following: "Section 3-916(b) establishes a true
apportionment of estate taxes among all takers, whether they be probate or non-probate,
unless a will states otherwise."
94. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15-1540 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1987).
95. A few commentators have questioned the propriety of apportioning the estate
tax, even in a total apportionment scheme, when small bequests are involved. See Sus-
man & Fourtieq, Apportionment of Death Taxes: A Comprehensive Survey with Pro-
posed Statute, 45 TEXAS L. RE.V. 1348, 1396-97 (1967) (suggesting that certain specific
devises comprising less than 10% of the taxable estate should not be required to pay a
share of the tax). Contra Comment, supra note 4, at 754 ("In a large estate, however,
this provision could operate as a loophole allowing a sizable bequest to pass tax free,
while increasing the amount of tax to be paid by other beneficiaries."). A provision ex-
cluding small devises from apportionment is based on an assumption that a decedent
probably intends that a small devise should pass to a beneficiary without being dimin-
ished by its share of the estate tax. Id.
96, Scoles & Stephens, supra note 92, at 918. For an interesting look at other appor-
tionment methods, see Mitnick, State Legislative Apportionment of the Federal Estate
Tax, 10 MD. L. REv. 289, 312-17 (1949).
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to determine the recipient's tax burden. The statute further
allows the personal representative to apportion the taxes on his
own initiative since a judicial order allowing apportionment is
not required.
C. Contrary Will Provisions
The statute allows the estate tax to be apportioned by the
statutory formula "unless the will otherwise provides."9 8 Al-
though this requirement appears straightforward, the statute is
silent concerning what language is required to overcome its op-
eration.9 Consequently, in those states that use a similar stat-
ute, courts have had to decide when a will provision apportion-
ing estate taxes overrides the statute. 100
97. Scoles & Stephens, supra note 92, at 918. Under I.R.C. § 2207A, the formula
does not apply to property for which an election to qualify for the marital deduction
pursuant to I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) has been made. The personal representative under this
section "is empowered to recover an amount equal to the excess of the total amount of
estate tax payable by the estate, less the amount which would have been payable had the
qualified terminable property ('Q-tip property') not been included in the gross estate of
the decedent." Mauer, Estate Tax Apportionment, 14 COLO. LAW. 208, 209 (1985).
98. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
99. Several commentators have addressed the necessity of an apportionment stat-
ute having a standard will provision that will overcome its operation. See Note, Statu-
tory Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1022, 1025-26 (1949);
Note, Proposal for Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 30 IND. L.J. 217, 229
(1955). For an example of suggested provisions that may overcome the operation of an
apportionment statute, see Wintermute, supra note 23, at 1162-66.
Even a will containing a general prohibition against apportionment may not be suffi-
cient to avoid apportionment with regard to those assets covered under the Code's ap-
portionment provisions-general powers of appointment, life insurance proceeds, and Q-
TIP property. At least one court has held that before a will can preclude apportionment
for property covered under the Code, the will must specifically reference this property.
See In re Will of Gordon, 134 Misc. 2d 247, 510 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Surr. Ct. 1986). North
Carolina's apportionment statute provides that a general direction in the will that taxes
shall not be apportioned is not sufficient to overcome the statutory requirement of ap-
portionment with respect to life insurance proceeds, powers of appointment property,
and Q-TIP property. These assets must be specifically exonerated in a will provision not
to apportion before apportionment will be precluded. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-27-2(b)
(Supp. 1987).
100. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that, in the absence of an unambiguous
provision in a will not to apportion estate taxes, the existence of an apportionment stat-
ute creates a strong presumption in favor of apportionment of the tax and that those
who argue against apportionment must bear the burden of proof. See, e.g., In re Pepper's
Estate, 307 N.Y. 242, 120 N.E.2d 807 (1954); In re Tropp's Will, 67 Misc. 2d 819, 324
N.Y.S.2d 518 (Surr. Ct. 1971). Conflicts are resolved in favor of apportionment. See, e.g.,
Estate of Leonard, 9 A.D.2d 1, 189 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1959); In re Wheeler's Will, 19 Misc.
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Under the statute, a decedent can overcome the apportion-
ment formula only by a provision in the will.101 Attempts to
change the operation of the statute by nontestamentary means
are ineffective. Thus, a settlor cannot exonerate a trust from tax
liability or allocate the tax burden among its beneficiaries
through a provision in a trust agreement. 102 Also, a decedent
who, prior to his death, transfers property that will be contained
in the taxable estate cannot contractually guarantee a transferee
that he will exclude that property from tax liability.1 0 3
D. Exceptions to the Statutory Formula
1. Income Beneficiaries and Life Tenants
Income and life interests, as opposed to principal and re-
mainder interests, created special problems under earlier appor-
tionment statutes. Although both contributed to the estate tax
liability, it was almost impossible to devise an acceptable
formula to apportion fairly the tax between the present and fu-
ture interests.
04
Section (f) of the statute requires that the corpus or the re-
mainder interest bear the estate tax liability for both inter-
ests. 10 5 Most commentators believe this result is fair, given the
complexities of apportioning the tax between the two interests
and the policies supporting the rule.06 A contrary rule would
cause delays in closing estates and could require that an income
beneficiary pay a portion of the estate tax from funds that had
been earmarked for his support-a result clearly contrary to the
decedent's intent.10 7 Also, since the estate tax payment will re-
duce the corpus used to generate the income, the income recipi-
ent indirectly will contribute to the tax through decreased in-
come payments. 08
2d 335, 186 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
101. Scoles & Stephens, supra note 92, at 918.
102. Note, supra note 8, at 732-33.
103, Id.
104. Scoles & Stephens, supra note 92, at 933.
105. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(f) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
106. Note, supra note 8, at 721.
107. Id.
108. Id. This argument is inapplicable if the beneficiary receives a specific dollar
amount, as opposed to all or a percentage of the income from a fund, since payment of
[Vol. 39
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2. Shares Qualifying for a Deduction
The drafters of the statute clearly intended that property
qualifying for a deduction under the Code should not be appor-
tioned a share of the estate tax.'09 This result is fair since these
interests do not increase the estate's tax liability.1" 0 Further-
more, if taxes are imposed on these deductible interests, reduc-
ing the value of the assets passing to the recipient, the estate tax
will be higher because only the value of the assets passing to the
beneficiary can qualify for a deduction.
11 '
Section (e)(1) plainly indicates that property receiving a de-
duction should not be apportioned a share of the tax liability:
"In making an apportionment, allowances shall be made for any
. . . deductions and credits allowed by the law imposing the
tax.""' 2 According to at least one commentator, however, the ap-
portionment formula can be read to require the apportionment
of taxes to these deductible interests." 3
Under the statutory formula, the tax is apportioned to all
"persons interested in the estate.""14 The statute defines "per-
sons interested in the estate" as "any person entitled to receive,
or who has received, from a decedent or by reason of the death
of a decedent any property or interest therein included in the
decedent's estate.""5 The amount apportioned is "the propor-
tion that the value of the interest of each person interested in
the estate bears to the total value of the interests of all persons
interested in the estate."'" 6
Since individuals and organizations receiving a deductible
gift are not excluded from the definition of a person interested
in the estate, a literal reading of the apportionment formula re-
quires that the tax be apportioned to these deductible shares."
7
This result could have been avoided if the drafters had defined
the estate tax in this situation will not affect the amount of money paid to the
beneficiary.
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(e)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
110. Comment, supra note 4, at 752.
111. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(e)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
113. Note, supra note 8, at 736 n.160.
114. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
115. Id. § 62-3-916(a)(3) (emphasis added).
116. Id. § 62-3-916(b).
117. Note, supra note 8, at 736 n.160.
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"person interested in the estate" as "any person entitled to re-
ceive, or who has received, from a decedent or by reason of the
death of a decedent any property or interest therein included in
the decedent's [taxable] estate."11
If the statute is interpreted to exclude from tax liability
property qualifying for a deduction, as was the intent of the
drafters, a deductible interest may still have to bear a share of
the tax burden under certain circumstances. The first of these
situations occurs, as previously discussed, when a remainder in-
terest consists of assets that qualify for a deduction. 119 Although
this result appears incongruous given the federal policies under-
lying such an exemption, it is justified because of the aforemen-
tioned practical problems of apportioning the tax in this
situation.
A second situation in which a deductible interest may have
to pay a portion of the tax is when a surviving spouse elects to
take an elective or forced share.12 0 The issue is whether the elec-
tive share should be computed on the decedent's estate before or
after the estate is reduced by estate taxes.' 21 If the elective share
is computed after estate taxes have been deducted from the net
estate, the surviving spouse essentially is charged with a portion
of the tax burden. 2 2 Since the surviving spouse's elective share
qualifies for the marital deduction and generates no tax liability,
this result would again be inequitable.
Unfortunately, the statute does not address the surviving
spouse's elective share. In states that have adopted a statutory
apportionment scheme, however, the arguments are persuasive
118. SC. CoDE ANN. § 62-3-916(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
119. S.C. COD. ANN. § 62-3-916(f) (Law. Co-op. 1987); Comment, supra note 4, at
752.
120. The concept of a forced or elective share is contained in the South Carolina
Probate Code at §§ 62-2-201 to -207. These sections provide that a surviving spouse is
entitled to one-third of the probate estate of a deceased spouse. If a surviving spouse
does not receive one-third of the decedent's probate assets under the will, he or she may
elect to take a one-third share as provided by the statute. The surviving spouse's forced
share, however, will be reduced by the assets received as a part of the probate estate.
Under the elective share provisions of the Probate Code, this right can only be enforced
against property passing under the decedent's will and not against property passing
outside of the will. Also, property received by a surviving spouse through non-probate
transfers is not counted in determining whether the surviving spouse has received his or
her appropriate share of the decedent's estate. See Medlin, supra note 90, at 661.
121. Kahn, supra note 39, at 1499.
122. Id. at 1500.
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for computing the elective share before the net estate is reduced
by estate taxes.123 Because the statute specifically exempts
shares qualifying as a deduction, 24 this provision should encom-
pass a surviving spouse's elective share. Also, the South Carolina
General Assembly's decision to adopt an apportionment statute
indicates its desire to apportion taxes on an equitable basis.
Since an elective share does not generate an estate tax liability,
equity dictates that the share not be reduced by that liability.'25
These arguments will not prevail if the statute providing for
the elective share specifically requires that the net estate be re-
duced by estate taxes before the elective share is taken.126 Under
the Probate Code, which provides for a surviving spouse's elec-
tive share, the spouse is entitled to the elective share after the
reduction of proper claims and funeral and administrative ex-
penses.2 1 Because the definitional section of the Probate Code
states that a claim does not include estate and inheritance
taxes, 28 an argument can be made that the statute mandates
that a surviving spouse taking an elective share be given the
share prior to any reduction in the net estate for estate taxes.
Even if this particular interpretation is not accepted, it seems
reasonable that a court would reach this conclusion based upon
rational analysis and equitable principles.
3. Receipt of Periodic Payments
Often a decedent will contract with a third party to require
that the third party make payments to a designated beneficiary
after the decedent's death. Traditionally, this situation arises
with installment payments under an employee benefit plan 29 or
when a life insurance contract pays the beneficiary periodic pay-
ments. 30 Since such property adds to the decedent's taxable es-
tate by the full value of the contract, some state apportionment
123. Id. at 1515.
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(f) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
125. Kahn, supra note 39, at 1515. Contra Weinberg v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
198 Md. 539, 85 A.2d 50 (1951) (dissenting widow's share chargeable with estate taxes
over a statutory rule of apportionment).
126. Kahn, supra note 39, at 1512.
127. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-202 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
128. Id. § 62-1-201.
129. I.R.C. § 2042.
130. Id. § 2039(a)-(c).
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schemes statutorily require that the third party payor pay the
tax attributable to the beneficiary's interest. The obvious justifi-
cation for such a provision is to shift the initial tax payment to
the party with the means to pay the tax. The third party would
then reduce the amount of the installment payments to compen-
sate for the initial outlay of the tax.
131
Although the statute does not directly address this issue, it
is unlikely that the third party would be obligated to pay the
beneficiary's share of the tax.'32 The statute provides that the
personal representative has the right to recover the tax only
from a "person interested in the estate.' 33 The statutory defini-
tion of "persons interested in the estate" does not seem broad
enough to cover these kinds of third party payors.1
3 4
E. Apportionment of Other Items Under the Statute
1. Uncollectible Shares
As previously noted, the Revised Uniform Act charges un-
collectible shares against the residuary estate. 3 5 Although this
method is convenient administratively, it results in the diminu-
tion of a deductible gift when a surviving spouse or charity is the
devisee of a residuary gift. 36 South Carolina changed this result
by adopting the Uniform Probate Code's version of the appor-
tionment statute. Under the Probate Code, uncollectible shares
are reallocated among individuals who initially are charged a
share of the tax.
137
2. Interest and Penalties
The statute apportions interest and penalties imposed by
the Code in the same manner that it apportions the estate tax. 8'
131. Note, supra note 8, at 721.
132. Id.
133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
134. "'Persons interested in the estate' means any person entitled to receive, or who
has received, from a decedent or by reason of the death of a decedent any property or
interest therein included in the decedent's estate." Id. § 62-3-916(a)(3).
135. See supra note 92.
136. Note, supra note 8, at 731-32.
137. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(g) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
133. Id. § 62-3-916(c)(2).
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This requirement, however, is subject to two major exceptions.
Under section (e)(2), interest and penalties are not apportioned
when the application of the general rule would be unfair: "If the
court finds that it is inequitable to apportion interest and penal-
ties in the manner provided in subsection (b), because of special
circumstances, it may direct apportionment thereof in the man-
ner it finds equitable."139 This section may be used to hold a
single beneficiary liable for interest and penalties when his delay
causes the additional assessment by the IRS.1 0
A second exception to the general rule concerns the assess-
ment of penalties and interest brought about by the delay of the
personal representative. 141 A court may hold the personal repre-
sentative liable for the entire amount of interest and penalties if
his delay caused the assessment by the IRS.
142
3. Credits
Section (e) of the statute addresses the apportionment of
several types of estate tax credits allowed under the Code. 43
While some of these credits inure directly to the benefit of spe-




Under section (e)(3) of the statute, any credit for property
previously taxed or any credit for foreign estate or gift taxes
paid by the decedent or the decedent's estate inures to the pro-
portionate benefit of all persons subject to apportionment, re-
gardless of which estate assets generate the credit.145 The statute
does not address the situation in which the tax that gives rise to
a credit has been paid by a particular beneficiary.
Section (e)(4) of the statute concerns credits for inheritance,
succession, and estate taxes. Any credit generated by these types
139. Id.
140. Note, supra note 8, at 727.
141. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 62-3-916(c)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
142. Note, supra note 8, at 727-28.
143. These credit are: Unified Credit, I.R.C. § 2010; Credit for State Death Taxes,
I.R.C. § 2011; Credit for Gift Tax, I.R.C. § 2012; Credit for Tax on Prior Transfers
(credit for estate tax paid on transfer of property to the decedent from a person who dies
within 10 years before or 2 years after the death of the decedent), I.R.C. § 2013; Credit
for Foreign Death Taxes, I.R.C. § 2014.
144. See Scoles & Stephens, supra note 92, at 926-33.
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(e)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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of state death taxes, with respect to property includable in the
estate, inures to the benefit of the person or interest chargeable
with the payment to the extent the credit reduces the tax.14
4. Nontax Expenses
Nontax expenses are those that the personal representative
incurs in his efforts to apportion and collect the tax. Although
both the Uniform Act and the Revised Uniform Act apportion
these expenses in the same manner that the tax is appor-
tioned,147 the Uniform Probate Code, and consequently the stat-
ute, do not address this issue.
148
F. Collection of the Apportioned Shares
1. Collection and Contribution
The statute envisions three situations in which apportion-
ment will be used. 149 First, the personal representative is enti-
tled to withhold from the property distributable to each individ-
ual beneficiary an amount necessary to satisfy each beneficiary's
tax liability.'6 Often, however, the distributable property pos-
sessed by the personal representative will be insufficient to meet
a beneficiary's estate tax liability. This insufficiency occurs fre-
quently when a beneficiary has received a large gift outside of
the probate estate. In this instance, the personal representative
may retain the beneficiary's property to coerce him to pay his
share of the tax. 51 If the personal representative does not pos-
sess any property of a beneficiary to whom part of the tax is
apportioned, he may still recover from the beneficiary his appor-
tioned share of the tax.
1' 2
The statute recognizes the possibility that the personal rep-
resentative may not be able to allocate and collect all of the es-
146. Id.
147. See supra note 92.
148. Note, supra note 8, at 729-30.
149. See Scoles & Stephens, supra note 92, at 925.
150. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
151. Scoles & Stephens, supra note 92, at 934.
152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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tate tax liabilities before the tax payment is due.153 Under these
circumstances, the personal representative may need to pay the
tax from the residuary estate or any other property in his pos-
session. 54 In some states, the personal representative may have
a right to acquire from the beneficiary a sum equal to the benefi-
ciary's apportioned tax share plus the interest accrued on this
sum as compensation to the beneficiary who has lost the use of
his funds during this period. 55
If the distributable property of a beneficiary is insufficient
to meet his liability and the beneficiary cannot or will not volun-
tarily remit his share to the personal representative, the per-
sonal representative has an affirmative duty under section (g) of
the statute to institute a judicial proceeding to seek contribution
from the noncontributing party. 56 The personal representative
must wait at least three months after the final determination of
the tax liability to sue for recovery of the apportioned share.
57
If the personal representative sues within a reasonable time af-
153. Under §§ 2206, 2207, and 2207A of the Code, it appears that a personal repre-
sentative must pay all the tax from the funds at his disposal before allocation to and
collection from the other beneficiaries of the estate. States that have adopted the Uni-
form Probate Code appear to permit apportionment and collection prior to payment
under § (d)(1). This practice presumably will improve liquidity by allowing beneficiaries
to contribute liquid assets to the personal representative as opposed to requiring the sale
of certain nonliquid assets in the estate. Pennell, Tax Payment Provisions and Equita-
ble Apportionment: Drafting to Span Legal Voids, 22 INST. ON EST. PLAN. I - (1988)
(to be published).
Under the Uniform Probate Code, it is slightly easier for a personal representative
to apportion and collect the tax during this time. Under this version, the personal repre-
sentative can determine apportionment by his own initiative, instead of through a court
order, since a judicial determination of apportionment is not required: "The court in
which venue lies for the administration of the estate of a decedent, on petition for the
purpose, may determine the apportionment of the tax." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(c)(1)
(Law. Co-op. 1987) (emphasis added). Under the Uniform Act, apportionment must be
obtained by court order. Note, supra note 8, at 714-15 n.58.
154. Pennell, supra note 153, at _; Note, supra note 8, at 730 n.132.
155. Neither the Uniform Acts nor the Uniform Probate Code make a provision for
the payment of interest to beneficiaries who lose income when the personal representa-
tive uses their property to pay the taxes allocated to other property in the taxable estate.
Absent a statutory provision, the courts apparently have split on this issue. See gener-
ally, Annotation, Remedies and Practice Under Estate Tax Apportionment Statutes, 71
A.L.R.3D 371, 437 (1976). Because courts have held the tax due from a beneficiary to be
an unliquidated obligation until the apportioned share is determined by the court or the
personal representative, some courts have allowed the personal representative the right
to retain interest only from the time the apportioned share has been ascertained. Id.
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ter this period, the statute exonerates him from liability for es-
tate taxes that may become uncollectible during this period 158
2. Requirement of a Bond
Section (d)(2) of the statute allows the personal representa-
tive to distribute property to a beneficiary prior to a final appor-
tionment of the tax. The beneficiary, however, must post a bond
with the personal representative sufficient to cover the amount
of the tax liability.159
G. Conflict of Laws
The apportionment of estate taxes by a personal representa-
tive can be extremely difficult in the multistate context. When a
decedent, domiciled in an apportionment jurisdiction, makes a
non-probate transfer that affects the estate's tax liability to an
out-of-state beneficiary, a state's entire apportionment scheme
may be threatened. Unless the personal representative can com-
pel the nonresident beneficiary to pay his apportioned share of
the tax, the remaining probate and non-probate beneficiaries
may be forced to contribute the nonresident beneficiary's share,
substantially diminishing the value of their transfers from the
decedent.160
The personal representative has several means of obtaining
the nonresident beneficiary's apportioned share. If the non-pro-
bate assets are covered by sections 2206, 2207, or 2207A of the
Code, federal law requires that these assets pay their propor-
tionate share of the estate tax liability, regardless of the appor-
tionment policies of the nonresident beneficiary's state. 61 If the
non-probate transfers are of a type not covered by the Code,
such as joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, gifts, or inter
158. Id.
159. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
160. As previously noted, uncollectible shares are allocated against the residuary es-
tate in states that have adopted the Revised Uniform Act. REVISED UNn'. ESTATE TAX
APPORTIONMENT AcT § 4 (1964). In South Carolina uncollectible shares are reallocated
among those individuals who are apportioned a share of the tax. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-
916(g) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
161. Scoles, Estate Tax Apportionment in the Multi-State Estate, 5 INST. ON EST.
PLAN. 1 71.717.1 (1971) ("These federal apportionment statutes apply to all estates wher-
ever located so there are few conflicts problems that relate to apportionment.").
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vivos trusts, the personal representative may seek apportion-
ment by other methods.
If the nonresident beneficiary of non-probate property is
also a beneficiary of certain probate property that passes
through the hands of the personal representative, the personal
representative has a right under section (d)(1) of the statute to
set off the beneficiary's tax liability against this probate prop-
erty."'2 If the probate property is not sufficient to offset the tax
liability or the nonresident beneficiary did not receive any pro-
bate assets under the testator's will, the personal representative
ultimately must initiate a contribution action to compel the non-
resident beneficiary to pay his apportioned share.
16 3
Unless the nonresident beneficiary voluntarily submits to
the jurisdiction of the probate court administering the estate,
the court cannot order the beneficiary to pay his apportioned
share.16 4 To obtain an order compelling the payment of the ap-
portioned share of the tax, a personal representative, if he can
obtain jurisdiction,1 5 may be forced to institute a suit against
162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
163. Id. § 62-3-916(g).
164. A judgment obtained against a nonresident beneficiary who submits to the ju-
risdiction of a foreign probate court is enforceable in the beneficiary's domicile under the
full faith and credit clause. See generally R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW § 73 (4th ed. 1986). Also, if the nonresident beneficiary can be served
within the decedent's domicile, the probate court administering the estate may be able to
demand contribution from the nonresident beneficiary. See Humphrey v. Langford, 246
Ga. 732, 733, 273 S.E.2d 22, 23 (1980) ("[W]hen an individual is personally served within
the state, we are talking about actual presence. Minimum contacts analysis is not
necessary.").
165. The issue of whether a personal representative can obtain jurisdiction over tak-
ers of non-probate property located in other jurisdictions is a complex one, turning on
both federal and state law. From a state law perspective, one noted author stated that
"[a]bsent a statutory right to bring an action, it is literally anyone's guess whether a
personal representative will successfully obtain jurisdiction over a recalcitrant non-pro-
bate beneficiary." Pennell, supra note 153, at I -
In South Carolina, as in some other states that have adopted the Uniform Probate
Code, a domiciliary foreign personal representative might maintain such an action under
Article 4 of the Probate Code. Although these Article 4 provisions clearly were enacted
to allow a foreign personal representative to pursue foreign assets of the testator which
should be included in the testator's estate, the language of Article 4 is arguably broad
enough to include a contribution action by a foreign personal representative against an
in-state beneficiary for estate taxes.
Under Article 4, a foreign personal representative can come into South Carolina and
voluntarily collect obligations from "any person indebted to the estate of the nonresident
decedent." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-4-201 (Law. Co-op. 1987). If the foreign personal repre-
sentative cannot collect the obligation voluntarily, a suit against a debtor of the estate
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the nonresident beneficiary in the beneficiary's domicile. A suit
in the nonresident beneficiary's domicile, however, does not
guarantee that the personal representative will retrieve the ben-
eficiary's share of the estate tax obligation. The foreign jurisdic-
tion initially must determine whether its law or the law of the
testator's domicile governs the controversy. 16  Although some
can be maintained if two conditions are satisfied: (1) no local administration is being
conducted or no petition to conduct such an administration is pending, and (2) the for-
eign personal representative files "with a court in this State in a county in which prop-
erty belonging to the decedent is located, authenticated copies of his appointment, the
will, if any, and of any official bond he has given." Id. § 62-4-204. A foreign personal
representative who meets these requirements "may exercise as to assets in this state all
powers of a local representative." Id. § 62-4-205. Since a local representative is empow-
ered under § 62-3-916(d)(1) to seek contribution of estate taxes from a beneficiary re-
ceiving a non-probate transfer, a foreign personal representative also would be granted
this power under Article 4.
Under § (8)(b)(1) of the Uniform Act and the Revised Uniform Act, a nonresident
personal representative can bring a suit for apportionment in a foreign jurisdiction if the
decedent's domicile also allows an apportionment action by a foreign personal represen-
tative. At least one author has suggested that the denial of this right on the basis of
reciprocity may violate the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. Scoles & Ste-
phens, supra note 92, at 935.
Both § (8)(b)(2) of the Uniform Act and the Revised Uniform Act permit an action
to enforce contribution, regardless of reciprocity, if the apportionment is authorized by
Congress. While this provision authorizes contribution suits by foreign personal repre-
sentatives for §§ 2206, 2207, and 2207A transfers, even without an authorizing state stat-
ute, the issue has been broached whether § 2205 extends a federal cause of action to
beneficiaries who have paid a portion of a nonresident beneficiary's estate tax liability.
Scoles & Stephens, supra note 92, at 963. The pertinent portion of § 2205 states:
If the tax or any part thereof is paid by, or collected out of, that part of the
estate passing to or in the possession of any person other than the execu-
tor. . ., such person shall be entitled to reimbursement. . . by a just and equi-
table contribution by the persons. . . whose interest is subject to equal or prior
liability for the payment of taxes ...
I.R.C. § 2205.
166. See Comment, supra note 4, at 750-71. See generally Scoles, Apportionment of
Federal Estate Taxes and Conflict of Laws, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 261 (1955). Professor
Scoles notes that the question of whether to apply the apportionment statute of the
forum state or the apportionment statute of the decedent's domicile may initially turn
on whether the forum state characterizes the issue as either succession or administration:
The categories of succession and administration in estate and probate cases are
roughly the equivalent of the substance and procedure dichotomy in other ar-
eas.. .. [T]he matter of apportionment is usually treated as a matter of sub-
stance or succession to which the forum's local law theoretically does not auto-
matically apply. . . . If the matter were viewed as one of administration
(procedure), the forum would apply its own local law.
Scoles, supra, at 267-68.
Assuming the court treats the issue as one of succession, the court next will examine
the forum's conflict-of-laws rules to determine which state's substantive law should ap-
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courts hold that, because the forum state is the situs of the
property, its law applies,167 other courts have rejected this con-
clusion based on a governmental interest analysis, holding that
the law of the testator's domicile applies.168 A determination by
ply. A court using a vested rights theory of conflicts would likely apply its own appor-
tionment statute to govern the controversy based upon the situs of the non-probate as-
set. See, e.g., Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334
(1950). A court using the non-traditional governmental interest analysis probably would
reject the law of the situs based upon the strength of the interest of the decedent's domi-
cile when compared to that of the forum. Mazza v. Mazza, 475 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Governmental interest analysis clearly is the more appropriate test. In Mazza the
court refused to consider the situs of the non-probate asset because a vested rights anal-
ysis seemed inappropriate to the allocation of federal estate taxes:
Concerns with the stability of use of, and marketability of title to, land were
bases of the traditional conflicts rule that the law of the situs governs ques-
tions of succession to land, and allocation of the federal estate taxes is at least
a related issue. In respect to such considerations, however, it is possible to dis-
tinguish between questions of succession to land and those concerning appor-
tionment of estate taxes against the land. The question of apportionment could
affect title to the land only indirectly at best, and would in any event affect
only a portion of the value. Unlike questions relating to the validity of title,
the issue of tax liability is one of short duration. The attenuation of this rela-
tionship suggests that a principal reason for the concern with stability of ti-
tle-the danger of third-party reliance on the law of the situs-is insubstantial
with regard to the responsibility for estate taxes. Since it seems that the inter-
ests underlying the traditional rule are not involved in this case, the rule cast
no weight into the balance.
Id. at 391.
While the logic of Mazza is compelling, some states, as illustrated by Isaacson, will
continue to apply their apportionment law based upon the situs of the non-probate
transfer, frustrating the efforts of the personal representative to obtain a proportionate
distribution of the tax. To resolve this problem, Scoles advocates that all states adopt
the following provision:
Estate or death taxes imposed by the United States by reason of the inclusion
of real or personal property located or administered in this state in the estate
for tax purposes of a non-resident of this state shall be apportioned among the
persons interested in the estate to whom such property may be transferred or
to whom any benefit accrues only in accordance with the law of the decedent's
domicile applicable to property located therein.
Scoles, supra, at 309.
167. See, e.g., Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91
N.E.2d 334 (1950). Isaacson was an action by an executor against a trustee to charge the
trust with its pro rata share of the estate's taxes. The trust property was in Massachu-
setts, a residue jurisdiction, but the decedent was domiciled in Maine, an apportionment
jurisdiction. The court, noting the plethora of contacts the trust had with the forum
state, held "that to apply the Maine statute in this case would be to give to that statute
extraterritorial effect contrary to first principles." Id. at 471, 91 N.E.2d at 336 (citing
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS §§ 47-49 (1934)).
168. Mazza, 475 F.2d 385; see, e.g., Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
In Mazza the court, referencing Doetsch, listed three reasons why the interests of the
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a court that the law of the testator's domicile governs the con-
troversy ultimately will result in a judgment against the nonresi-
dent beneficiary in the amount of the tax liability. 6 9 A determi-
nation by a court that the forum's own law will apply may result
in apportionment, depending on what type of apportionment
statute the state uses and how it interprets its own law. 17 0
H. Application
Since the enactment of the Uniform Act in 1958, the tradi-
tional estate tax has undergone a variety of changes. Although
the Uniform Act is based on the federal estate tax as it existed
in 1958, subsequent congressional modifications to the estate tax
have made the Uniform Act antiquated in some instances. Thus,
application of the Uniform Act to several of the Code's provi-
sions is now problematic.
Under section 2035(d) of the Code, the amount of gift tax
paid by a decedent who dies within three years after making a
gift to a beneficiary must be included in the decedent's gross
estate, concomitantly contributing to the estate's tax liability.
117
The apportionment provisions of the Probate Code apparently
do not allow the personal representative to retrieve the amount
of the estate tax attributable to the gift tax payment from the
recipient of the gift. Under the statute, the tax can be appor-
tioned only "among all persons interested in the estate.' ' 72 "Per-
sons interested in the estate" are defined as "any person[s] enti-
decedent's domicile were paramount to the interests of the forum:
First, reference by all jurisdictions in which the decedent left property to the
law of the decedent's domicile insures uniform treatment of all those receiving
property from the decedent's taxable estate. Second, this question is similar to
other problems relating to the administration of estates and to determinations
of intent which are governed by the law of the domicile. Finally, the decedent's
domicile is usually the jurisdiction concerned with the protection of the dece-
dent's widow and children, and deference to that state's policy in such matters
is appropriate.
475 F.2d at 389.
169. See, e.g., Mazza, 475 F.2d 385; Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323; Trust Co. v. Nichols, 62
N.J. Super. 495, 163 A.2d 205 (1960); In re Peabody's Estate, 114 Misc. 706, 115
N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1952); In re Gato's Estate, 276 A.D. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171, aff'd,
301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E.2d 924 (1950).
170. See Scoles, supra note 161, at 1 71,714.
171. I.R.C. § 2035(d).
172. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 62-3-916(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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tled to receive, or who ha[ve] received, from a decedent or by
reason of the death of a decedent any property or interest
therein included in the decedent's estate".7 Clearly, the gift
beneficiary is not a person interested in the estate because the
value of the gift is not included in the decedent's taxable estate.
The IRS actually receives the property that is included in the
decedent's taxable estate.
Barring the unlikely payment by the IRS of the estate tax
attributable to the gift tax payment, two alternatives exist. First,
the share of the tax attributable to the gift tax payment could
be considered an uncollectible share, reallocated among those in-
itially charged a share of the tax.174 Second, an equitable argu-
ment may allow the tax to be apportioned to the beneficiary of
the gift. The South Carolina General Assembly's decision to
adopt an apportionment statute indicates its desire to apportion
taxes on an equitable basis. Since the gift to the beneficiary gen-
erates the tax liability, it is only fair that the gift beneficiary pay
this apportioned share of the tax. This result seems justified be-
cause the remaining beneficiaries already must pay an appor-
tioned share of the tax while the gift recipient has retained his
gift tax-free.
More difficult to resolve are the apportionment problems
created under section 4981 of the Code. Enacted by the 1986
Tax Reform Act, section 4981A, inter alia, places an additional
fifteen percent excise tax on "excessive accumulated distribu-
tions"'175 from qualified retirement plans, tax-sheltered annui-
ties, and IRA's.7 e The 4981A tax was a congressional response
to the perceived problem of individuals placing funds in tax-free
173. Id. § 62-3-916(c)(3) (emphasis added).
174. Id. § 62-3-916(g).
175. Under § 4981A, the new 15% tax is generally imposed on all distributions from
tax-advantaged retirement income vehicles that exceed $150,000. For purposes of this
section, all retirement distributions within a calendar year, regardless of the employer,
are aggregated in determining whether the retirement distributions exceed $150,000.
Irish, Estate and Gift Tax Ramifications of the Employee Benefit Provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 21 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1603 (1987). Retirement distribution
sources that are aggregated include:
(1) A plan that was at any time qualified under I.R.C. sections 401(a) or 403(a);
(2) An annuity that was at any one time described in I.R.C. section 403(b); and
(3) I.R.A. accounts and annuities.
Id.
176. General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, FED. TAXEs (P-H) 1
59,025 at 754-55 (May 11, 1987).
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retirement vehicles and not subjecting these funds to the federal
income tax by subsequently withdrawing them during their re-
tirement years.1 77 Section 4981A now forces individuals to with-
draw retirement contributions over a period of years as opposed
to allowing them to wait and make larger, one-time
withdrawals.
7 8
To complement the fifteen percent additional excise tax on
excessive distributions, the federal estate tax is also increased
under section 4981A(d)(1) by fifteen percent of the amount of
the decedent's "excess retirement accumulation."1 79 Although
the tax complements the federal estate tax and is paid by the
personal representative, it bears little similarity to the federal
estate tax. The unified credit is not used in computing the tax
due.8 0 Likewise, the marital deduction cannot be used to reduce
the additional fifteen percent tax. 8'
Section 4981A contains no apportionment provision similar
to sections 2206, 2207, or 2207A. Thus, an initial threshold in-
quiry must be made to decide whether a state's apportionment
provisions apply to the fifteen percent tax. Under the statute,
the term "tax" means "the federal estate tax and the basic and
any additional [estate tax] imposed by the State of South Caro-
lina and interest and penalties imposed in addition to the
tax."'82 While the fifteen percent tax must be paid with the fed-
eral estate tax, it is certainly arguable that, given the inapplica-
bility of the unified credit and the marital deduction, the fifteen
percent tax is not an estate tax. Therefore, the tax falls outside
of the statute. Furthermore, the designation of the tax as an ex-
cise tax under the Code provides further evidence that the tax
falls outside of the statute.
If the section 4981A(d)(1) tax is within the apportionment
provisions of the statute, it appears that, based on the statutory
177. Id.
178. See id,
179. Irish, supra note 175, at T 1603. The "excess retirement accumulation" is the
amount that the aggregate value of the decedent's interest in qualified retirement plans
exceeds "the present value of an annuity over a term certain equal to the life expectancy
of the individual immediately before death with annual payments of $150,000." Irish,
supra note 175, at T 1603.
180. I.R.C. § 4981A(d)(6) (1986).
181. Irish, supra note 175, at 1603.
182. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(a)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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formula, the additional fifteen percent tax would be apportioned
to all the beneficiaries receiving property included in the taxable
estate. This anomalous result is due to the statutory formula,
which apportions the tax based on "the proportion that the
value of the interest of each person interested in the estate bears
to the total value of the interest of all person interested in the
estate."' 18 3 The formula will not equitably apportion the tax to
the beneficiaries of an estate that has a section 4981A(d)(1) tax
because the formula is based on the assumption that the estate
tax is calculated using only the values of the decedent's probate
and non-probate transfers. This assumption obviously is not jus-
tified in the section 4981(d)(1) context. 8 4
If the section 4981A(d)(1) tax is outside of the apportion-
ment provisions of the statute, South Carolina courts may still
apportion the tax based upon equitable principles established at
common law. 18 5 Also, the argument could again be made that the
General Assembly's adoption of an apportionment statute indi-
cates its desire to apportion all taxes on an equitable basis. Ab-
sent one of these findings, the tax would be treated as a debt
against the estate and would be chargeable to the residuary es-
tate under prior South Carolina law.18
183. Id. § 62-3-916(b).
184. An equally anomalous result occurs when the beneficiary of retirement funds
becomes entitled to receive a marital or charitable deduction. Although these funds will
pass to the beneficiary under the statute without an apportioned estate tax share, the
retirement assets may produce a § 4981(d)(1) tax to the estate on any "excess retirement
accumulations."
If the statute is applicable to the § 4981(d)(1) tax, it is possible to read it as totally
exempting this beneficiary from the 4981(d)(1) tax liability, forcing the other takers of
property in the taxable estate to share this tax. Under § 62-3-916(b), the tax is to be
apportioned "among all persons interested in the estate." Under § 62-3-916(a)(3), a per-
son interested in the estate means "any person entitled to receive, or who has received,
from a decedent or by reason of the death of a decedent any property or interest therein
included in the decedent's estate." As previously noted, supra notes 109-118 and accom-
panying text, it is arguable that since all deductible shares are included in the gross
estate, this provision should be read as requiring apportionment of the estate tax to
beneficiaries of deductible gifts. Given the intent of the statute's drafters, the definition
of a "person interested in the estate" should be read to exclude all beneficiaries receiving
a marital or charitable deduction. Id. This reading again would produce the inequitable
result of having the excess accumulations tax apportioned against property that did not
produce the tax.
185. See Myers v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241 (1959) (federal estate tax
should be apportioned under common law to certain non-probate assets absent an ex-
press direction in a statute or the decedent's will).
186. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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VI. EVALUATION
A. The Federal Perspective
To address the complexities of apportioning estate taxes in
the multistate context, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws enacted the original version of the
Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act in August 1958. In ret-
rospect, it is safe to conclude that the Conference's goal of ob-
taining uniformity in the area of estate tax apportionment has
failed. Not only have three different interpretations of the Uni-
form Act been enacted, many states have chosen to adopt appor-
tionment statutes with provisions completely different from
those comprising the three versions of the Uniform Act.
187 Most
important, states disagree on the basic fundamental issue at the
core of estate tax apportionment: which scheme best allocates
the estate tax to the beneficiaries of a decedent's estate. 8
The lack of uniformity in estate tax apportionment presents
a multitude of problems in a mobile society. It is not uncommon
for one or more of the beneficiaries of a decedent's taxable estate
to reside in a state other than the decedent's state. As previously
described, the problems of collection and retrieval of the tax
from a nonresident beneficiary are multifarious and complex.189
If the personal representative is unable to retrieve this tax, the
remaining beneficiaries' shares may be further reduced by this
uncollectible share, leaving the intent of the decedent
unsatisfied. 190
Although the various state estate tax apportionment
schemes are inherently inadequate to solve the uniformity prob-
lem and its ramifications, a national policy could remedy
them. 91 Congress now has a beachhead in the estate tax appor-
tionment area with the three apportionment provisions of the
Code that address general powers of apportionment,9 2 life
187. See supra note 92.
188. See supra notes 57-58.
189. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
191. Note, supra note 8, at 735-36.
192. I.R.C. § 2207.
[Vol. 39
36
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss3/6
ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT
insurance proceeds,19  and Q-TIP property. 9 4 By themselves,
these provisions represent piecemeal legislation, inconsistent
with some state law apportionment provisions. Included in a na-
tional policy on estate tax apportionment, however, these provi-
sions could represent the foundation for a national uniform es-
tate tax apportionment statute.
B. The South Carolina Perspective
The estate tax provisions of the Probate Code represent the
first comprehensive estate tax apportionment statute ever
passed in South Carolina. Although the statute is a major im-
provement over section 12-15-1540 and brings South Carolina's
apportionment scheme in line with the apportionment scheme
used by a majority of the states, its adoption is not a panacea for
all of the estate tax apportionment problems in South Carolina.
The major problem with the statute is its use of total equi-
table apportionment, which presents two major areas of diffi-
culty. First, the statute changes the apportionment scheme used
in South Carolina. Individuals who relied on South Carolina's
use of partial equitable apportionment in drafting their wills
may be forced to revise these documents to bring them in line
with the current law.19 5 Second, in changing its method of ap-
193. I.R.C. § 2206.
194. I.R.C. § 2207A.
195. The Uniform Acts contain a procedural provision which attempts to clarify the
effect of an apportionment statute on prior wills. REVISED UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTION-
MENT AcT § 13 (1964). It states that the Uniform Act shall not apply to taxes due on
account of a decedent's death within a specific time period after the enactment of the
Uniform Act. The Uniform Act leaves it to each individual state to determine the appro-
priate time period.
The statute does not provide directly which estates will be subject to its provisions.
Whether the statute will apply to estates pending at the time of the statutory enactment,
will and trust instruments executed prior to the statutory enactment, or gifts made prior
to the statutory enactment is still an unresolved issue. To resolve it, a two-step analysis
must be applied. First, a threshold question must be addressed of whether the applica-
tion of the statute to a particular estate is constitutional. Second, if the application is
not unconstitutional, it must be determined whether the legislature actually intended
that the statute apply to the particular estate in question. See Annotation, Construction
and Application of Statutes Apportioning or Prorating Estate Taxes, 71 A.L.R.3D 247,
276-77 (1976).
A newly enacted apportionment statute that changes a state's method of apportion-
ment may be subject to constitutional attacks if retroactively applied. It is clear, how-
ever, that a state may apply the statute to the estate of a testator who dies after the
19881
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portionment from partial equitable apportionment, South Caro-
lina may have abandoned the apportionment method most likely
to approximate the testator's intent-a goal which should be
foremost in the minds of any legislative body enacting legislation
having an effect upon testamentary documents.19
The statute also does not address several areas of appor-
statute's enactment, regardless of when the testator's will was executed. In Re White-
law's Estate, 104 N.H. 307, 185 A.2d 65 (1962); cf. Parlato v. McCarthy, 136 Conn. 126,
69 A.2d 648 (1949) (apportionment statute applied to estates of persons dying up to a
year prior to enactment). Similarly, when a testator dies after a statute's enactment,
courts have denied assertions that the application of an apportionment statute to a trust
created prior to the statute's enactment is unconstitutional. Security First Nat'l Bank v.
Wellslager, 88 Cal. App. 2d 210, 198 P.2d 700 (1948); Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Merchants Nat'l Bank, 318 Mass. 563, 62 N.E.2d 831 (1945); In re Mayer's Estate, 174
Misc. 917, 22 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
Jurisdictions agree that the application of an apportionment statute to an estate
whose administration is pending at the time of the statutory enactment is constitutional.
See, e.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank, 318 Mass. 563, 62 N.E.2d 831. If the pending adminis-
tration has reached the point at which the liability of the various interests involved have
been determined, however, these determinations cannot be altered by a subsequently
enacted apportionment statute. See Weingarter v. Town of North Wales, 327 Mass. 731,
101 N.E.2d 132 (1951).
Since the South Carolina General Assembly did not incorporate § 13 into the new
statute, it might appear unclear which estates are subject to the new apportionment rule.
The general rule appears to be that "a legislative act will not be applied retroactively
unless such an intent clearly appears from the language used." Annot., supra, at 277. In
spite of this, most courts have held that the "phraseology of the typical apportionment
statute is such that the courts construe it as applying to any estate the administration of
which is not completed" by the time of the statute's enactment. Id.
Support for the proposition that the new statute applies to all wills probated after
the statute's enactment, regardless of when the wills were executed, can be drawn from
several South Carolina cases. In Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 316 S.E.2d 401 (1984), the
South Carolina Supreme Court abolished dower because it violated the equal protection
clauses of the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. In analyzing which inter-
ests would be affected by its decision, the court stated: "[I]t is the holding of the Court
that widows whose husbands die after the filing of this opinion are barred from dower
claims." Id. at 519, 316 S.E.2d at 403. Thus, the court refused to construe a testamentary
document with regard to the law applicable at the time of the execution of the Vill.
A similar case was In re Estate of Mercer, 288 S.C. 313, 342 S.E.2d 591 (1986). In
Mercer the supreme court invalidated § 21-7-480 of the South Carolina Code, which lim-
ited the amount of inheritance a man could bequeath or devise to "the woman with
whom he lives in adultery or of his bastard child or children" as unconstitutional. The
court held that the rights of all parties, though arising under a will made prior to the
invalidation of the provision, would no longer be governed by that provision. The court
stated: "Mindful of the rights of persons affected by the statute on the one hand, and the
need for the orderly probate of estates in South Carolina on the other, we hold S.C. Code
Ann. § 21-7-480 (1976) to be inapplicable to the estates of those persons dying on or
after August 19, 1982." 288 S.C. at 318, 342 S.E.2d at 593.
196. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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tionment law that a comprehensive statute must. Although not
often done, the statute should contain a sample will provision to
clarify the language necessary to override its effect.19 Also, the
statute needs to address a surviving spouse's elective share and
the impact equitable apportionment will have upon this
amount.19 8 Other questions not answered in the statute include:
(1) the allocation of expenses incurred in the collection of the
estate tax,'99 (2) a choice-of-laws provision, 00 (3) the liability of
a beneficiary receiving installment payments under an employee
benefit plan, an insurance contract, or an installment note,21
and (4) the allowance of interest to a beneficiary whose funds
have been temporarily used to pay the estate tax.0 2
The statute also addresses certain problems inefficiently. Its
shortcomings are best exemplified by section (g), which requires
the personal representative to seek contribution from a noncon-
tributing party in order to escape liability for the uncollected
share.20 3 This provision should be revised to alleviate the per-
sonal representative from this obligation when it is highly un-
likely that the uncollected share can be recovered through a con-
tribution action.204 Furthermore, the personal representative
should not be required to bring a contribution action when the
expense necessary to recover the recalcitrant beneficiary's con-
tribution exceeds the uncollected share.
Another area in which the statute is inefficient is its overuse
of the apportionment mechanism. Under the statute, uncollected
shares are reallocated among all beneficiaries who pay a share of
the tax under any circumstances .205 This rule should be replaced
with a discretionary rule that allows a court to decide the most
equitable and economical method of reallocating the tax.20 6
The statute's apportionment formula is also overly complex
and ambiguous. As previously noted, it is difficult to determine
197. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 166.
201. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
203. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(g) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1987).
204. Note, supra note 8, at 731.
205. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-916(g) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
206. Note, supra note 8, at 732.
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if the statutory formula excludes deductible shares, even though
it is obvious from other provisions in the statute that these
shares should be excluded from apportionment. 07 The statute
also does not address the treatment of credits for foreign estate
or gift tax that are generated by a beneficiary's payment of these
taxes. 08
Finally, the statute is antiquated and does not deal easily
with several modifications to the federal estate tax, which were
enacted subsequent to the statute's drafting.20 9 Sections 2035(d)
and 4981A(d)(1) of the Code are the most noteworthy examples
of this problem. While a strained reading of the statute may al-
low for the resolution of apportionment questions under each of
these sections, the statute obviously is not designed to deal with
apportionment in these situations, which is evidenced by the in-
equitable results produced when the statute is applied to these
Code sections. Clearly, an amendment to the statute addressing
apportionment under these two areas of the Code is required to
make the statute both comprehensive and equitable.
C. Conclusion
The area of estate tax apportionment is characterized by a
strange interrelationship between the Code and the various state
statutes that attempt to allocate the estate tax burden. Thus,
the question of which beneficiaries of a decedent's probate and
non-probate transfers will pay the estate's tax liability is not
easily answered. In the context of multistate estates, the ques-
tion cannot be answered with any degree of certainty given the
divergent state approaches to the problem and the lack of a
comprehensive federal policy.
Because it is the responsibility of the states to allocate the
federal and state estate tax burden when the testator's will is
silent, each state must have a comprehensive estate tax appor-
tionment statute. The adoption of the new South Carolina estate
tax apportionment statute meets this need. Although portions of
the statute may need to be amended in an attempt to rectify its
shortcomings, it is a tremendous improvement over the previous
207. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
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statute.
It is important to realize, however, that any state apportion-
ment statute, no matter how well drafted, may be insufficient to
compel contribution from all of the estate's beneficiaries,21 par-
ticularly in the multistate context. Under the statute, the inabil-
ity of a personal representative to obtain contribution from a
recalcitrant out-of-state beneficiary will result in apportionment
of the uncollected estate tax to the remaining beneficiaries. De-
pending on the size of the recalcitrant beneficiary's share, this
could substantially frustrate the intent of the testator.
With this in mind, it is important that an estate planner
never rely on the new South Carolina statute to dictate which
assets will bear the burden of the estate's tax liability. Since a
testator virtually has complete authority to determine which of
his probate and non-probate assets will bear the estate tax bur-
den, an estate planner should deal with this issue only through
an estate tax allocation clause in the decedent's will.
211
James Howle Lucas*
210. Under the Probate Code, the terms devisee and beneficiary are not inter-
changeable. A devisee under the Probate Code includes those individuals "designated in
a will to receive a devise." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(8) (Law. Co-op. 1987). A devise,
when used as a noun, "means a testamentary disposition of real or personal property,
including both devise and bequest as formerly used. . . ." Id. § 62-1-201(7).
The term beneficiary under the Probate Code now relates solely to trust benefi-
ciaries. It includes "a person who has any present or future interest, vested or contin-
gent, and also includes the owner of an interest by assignment or other transfer and, as it
relates to a charitable trust, includes any person entitled to enforce the trust." Id. § 62-
1-201(2).
The usage of the term beneficiary has been expanded beyond the § 62-1-201(2) defi-
nition for the purposes of this Note. For example, the term has been used to describe
those persons who benefit from a decedent's non-probate transfers. It has also been used
to describe all persons entitled to receive or who have received any property or interest
included in a decedent's taxable estate.
211. A provision in a will designating that specific property be responsible for the
payment of the entire estate tax or its specific share of the estate tax may not be suffi-
cient to preclude the operation of an apportionment statute. When specific property is
made responsible for the payment of estate taxes, if the property is not sufficient to pay
its share or the entire share of the tax if required, the apportionment statute has been
held to apply to the amount of the deficiency. See generally Annot., supra note 195, at
388-43. If a testator wants to make certain non-probate transfers responsible for their
proportionate share of the estate tax, a provision providing for an alternative means for
the payment of the tax if the non-probate transfer has been exhausted should be in-
cluded in the tax clause.
* The author wishes to express his thanks to Professors Ladson Boyle and Alan
Medlin of the University of South Carolina School of Law for their valuable advice in
the preparation of this Note.
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SOUTH CAROLINA ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT STATUTE
Section 62-3-916
(a) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Estate" means the gross estate of a decedent as deter-
mined for the purpose of federal estate tax and the estate tax
payable to this State.
(2) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association,
joint stock company, corporation, government, political subdivi-
sion, governmental agency, or local governmental agency.
(3) "Persons interested in the estate" means any person en-
titled to receive, or who has received, from a decedent or by rea-
son of the death of a decedent any property or interest therein
included in the decedent's estate. It includes a personal repre-
sentative, conservator, and trustee.
(4) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the
United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico.
(5) "Tax" means the federal estate tax and the basic and
any additional estate tax imposed by the State of South Caro-
lina and interest and penalties imposed in addition to the tax.
(6) "Fiduciary" means personal representative or trustee.
(b) Unless the will otherwise provides, the tax shall be appor-
tioned among all persons interested in the estate. The appor-
tionment is to be made in the proportion that the value of the
interest of each person interested in the estate bears to the total
value of the interests of all persons interested in the estate. The
values used in determining the tax are to be used for that pur-
pose. If the decedent's will directs a method of apportionment of
tax different from the method described in this Code, the
method described in the will controls.
(c) (1) The court in which venue lies for the administration of
the estate of a decedent, on petition for the purpose, may deter-
mine the apportionment of the tax.
(2) If the court finds that it is inequitable to apportion in-
terest and penalties in the manner provided in subsection (b),
because of special circumstances, it may direct apportionment
thereof in the manner it finds equitable.
(3) If the court finds that the assessment of penalties and
interest assessed in relation to the tax is due to delay caused by
[Vol. 39
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the negligence of the fiduciary, the court may charge him with
the amount of the assessed penalties and interest.
(4) In any action to recover from any person interested in
the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the person in
accordance with this Code, the determination of the court in re-
spect thereto shall be prima facie correct.
(d) (1) The personal representative or other person in possession
of the property of the decedent required to pay the tax may
withhold from any property distributable to any person inter-
ested in the estate, upon its distribution to him, the amount of
tax attributable to his interest. If the property in possession of
the personal representative or other person required to pay the
tax and distributable to any person interested in the estate is
insufficient to satisfy the proportionate amount of the tax deter-
mined to be due from the person, the personal representative or
other person required to pay the tax may recover the deficiency
from the person interested in the estate. If the property is not in
the possession of the personal representative or the other person
required to pay the tax, the personal representative or the other
person required to pay the tax may recover from any person in-
terested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the
person in accordance with §§ 62-1-101 through 62-7-503.
(2) If property held by the personal representative is dis-
tributed prior to final apportionment of the tax, the distributee
shall provide a bond or other security for the apportionment lia-
bility in the form and amount prescribed by the personal
representative.
(e) (1) In making an apportionment, allowances shall be made
for any exemptions granted, any classification made of persons
interested in the estate, and for any deductions and credits al-
lowed by the law imposing the tax.
(2) Any exemption or deduction allowed by reason of the
relationship of any person to the decedent or by reason of the
purposes of the gift inures to the benefit of the person bearing
such relationship or receiving the gift; but if an interest is sub-
ject to a prior present interest which is not allowable as a deduc-
tion, the tax apportionable against the present interest shall be
paid from principal.
(3) Any deduction for property previously taxed and any
credit for gift taxes or death taxes of a foreign country paid by
the decedent or his estate inures to the proportionate benefit of
1988]
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all persons liable to apportionment.
(4) Any credit for inheritance, succession, or estate taxes or
taxes in the nature thereof applicable to property or interest in-
cludable in the estate, inures to the benefit of the persons or
interests chargeable with the payment thereof to the extent pro-
portionately that the credit reduces the tax.
(5) To the extent that property passing to or in trust for a
surviving spouse or any charitable, public, or similar purpose is
not an allowable deduction for purposes of the tax solely by rea-
son of an inheritance tax or other death tax imposed upon and
deductible from the property, the property is not included in the
computation provided for in subsection (b) hereof, and to that
extent no apportionment is made agianst the property. The sen-
tence immediately preceding does not apply to any case if the
result would be to deprive the estate of a deduction otherwise
allowable under Section 2053(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended, of the United States, relating to deduction for
state death taxes on transfers for public, charitable, or religious
uses.
(f) No interest in income and no estate for years or for life or
other temporary interest in any property or fund is subject to
apportionment as between the temporary interest and the re-
mainder. The tax on the temporary interest and the tax, if any,
on the remiander is chargeable against the corpus of the prop-
erty or funds subject to the temporary interst and remainder.
(g) Neither the personal representative nor other person re-
quired to pay the tax is under any duty to institute any action to
recover from any person interested in the estate the amount of
the tax apportioned to the person until the expiration of the
three months next following final determination of the tax. A
personal representative or other person required to pay the tax
who institutes the action within a reasonable time after the
three months' period is not subject to any liability or surcharge
because any portion of the tax apportioned to any person inter-
ested in the estate was collectible at a time following the death
of the decedent but thereafter became uncollectible. If the per-
sonal representative or other person required to pay the tax can-
not collect from any person interested in the estate the amount
of the tax apportioned to the person, the amount not recover-
able shall be equitably apportioned among the other persons in-
terested in the estate who are subject to apportionment.
[Vol. 39
44
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss3/6
1988] ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT 651
(h) A personal representative acting in another state or a person
required to pay the tax domiciled in another state may institute
an action in the courts of this State and may recover a propor-
tionate amount of the federal estate tax, of an estate tax payable
to another state or of a death duty due by a decedent's estate to
another state, from a person interested in the estate who is. ei-
ther domiciled in this State or who owns property in this State
subject to attachment or execution. For the purposes of the ac-
tion, the determination of apportionment by the court having
jurisdiction of the administration of the decedent's estate in the
other state is prima facie correct.
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